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 2 
Introduction 
Most schools of democratic theory consider political participation to have a positive impact in 
deepening democracy. Political participation makes democracies more accountable and freer, as 
well as creating more engaged, civic minded and public spirited citizens. It has been observed 
that in regimes where citizens lack capacity for self-organization and political engagement this 
contributes to a lower quality of their democratic regimes and institutions.  
Moreover, this connection is even more vital in democratizing settings and new 
democracies, like the Southern European countries of Portugal, Spain, and Greece. Research has 
shown that in democracies that emerged after a long experience of authoritarianism there will be 
a lower capacity for mobilization of citizens. Democratic regimes may became established, with 
the minimal requirements (freedom of the press, civil and political liberties, a functioning party 
system, free and fair elections), but they will have a lower quality because there will be very weak 
attachments of citizens to its institutions. After the euphoria of participation during the 
transition, desencanto (disenchantment, disappointment) settles in, estranging citizen’s from the 
democratic process. Contrary to older democracies, where political participation tended to grow 
steadily after the transition and for decades, in new democracies the high levels of participation 
of the transition give place to very weak levels of participation. Even more troubling, new 
democracies are also characterized by strong inequalities in participation, which affect especially 
popular groups and the poor, but also the middle classes (Fernandes, 2012 and 2014). 
Scientific research has already identified variations in levels of political participation 
between countries. For instance, differences in post-state corporatist democracies (Portugal, 
Spain) seem to be stark, with the latter having higher levels of associational membership. And as 
mentioned above, there are also major differences between new and old democracies 
(Fernandes, 2012, 2013, 2014; Fishman, 2010 and 2011). Still, there isn’t a clear cut scientific 
measure to compare and evaluate patterns of political participation between countries which is 
accepted both by the academic and the policy-making communities. Academic studies tend to be 
focused in comparisons between a small number of countries. And contemporary measures of 
political participation included in major international indices of democracy or development 
(Freedom House, UNDP, etc) have two major flaws.  
First, they are not historical enough (Coppedge et al. 2011). They tend to focus on 
contemporaneous issues, with very few indicators going back in time prior to the 1970s. This 
limitation makes assumptions about major trends in participation occurring today, as well as 
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projections of the future, problematic. Long time series are essential for policymakers, since 
shaping and influencing future events implies also a deep understanding of the past.  
Moreover, existing indices are quite “insensitive to important gradations” across 
countries and over time. For instance, in 2004, Freedom House gave same score on Political 
Rights to countries Bulgaria, Denmark, Israel, Mauritius, Panama, South Africa, Uruguay, and 
the United States (Coppedge, Gerring, et. al., 2011, p. 249; Lindberg, Coppedge, Gerring, Teorel, 
et. al. 2014). It is common for samples of countries that have competitive elections (ex: Sweden, 
Portugal and Slovakia) to receive similar scores (“democratic”), despite obvious differences in 
many other respects. And even indices where gradations in quality of elections, civil liberties, and 
other aspects of political participation (Freedom House, Polity) are taken into account, 
democratic countries tend to rank very close to each other. This suggests that scales are not as 
fine grained as they could be.  
In this paper we try to move beyond these shortcomings. First, we analyse the strengths 
and limitations of existing indices where political participation is taken as a significant dimension. 
Secondly, drawing from the Varieties of Democracy project, we propose a new conceptualization 
of political participation1. Thirdly, we compare the accuracy and rigour of the new V-Dem 
Indices with other long-established indices (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen’s 
Democratization Index), by using five Southern European countries (France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain) as test cases. 
 
1. Existing indices of Participation 
In this section we list and evaluate some of the most relevant tools for the measurement of 
participation. We start by describing the general features and operationalisation of the 
instrument, then focus on the specific items regarding participation and summarise their main 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
1.1. Freedom in the World (Freedom House) 
Established in 1973 by Freedom House, the Freedom in the World Index (FITW) was the first 
effort to systematically measure the distribution of freedom across the world. It is comprised of 
two different indices: the Political Rights Index (PRI) and the Civil Liberties Index (CLI). The 
PRI is composed of three sub-dimensions, which are the product of 10 indicators. The CLI is 
structured in four sub-categories, which are the product of aggregating 15 indicators. The PRI 
                                                      
1 Not to be confused with the Participatory Democracy Index and the Participatory Component Index of the V-
Dem project (https://v-dem.net/en/reference/version-4-mar-2015/) 
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and the CLI range from 1 (free) to 7 (not free) depending on the aggregation of scores attributed 
to each of its individual indicators. The average of the two indices returns a freedom rating, and 
Freedom House subsequently clusters countries within 3 groups: “not free”, “partially free”, and 
“free”. FITW covers virtually the whole world (both countries and disputed territories). Until 
recently the reports only provided two aggregated scores (PRI and CLI), but beginning in 2006 
Freedom House also began to publicize the scores at the subcategory level (4 for civil liberties 
and 3 for political rights). The scores for each indicator are coded by country experts. In the 
2013 edition there were 60 analysts and around 30 advisers involved. 
In the subcategory “Political Pluralism and Participation” of the Political Rights Index 
countries are awarded from 0 (no) to 4 (yes) in each of the following indicators/questions, 
leading to a score range in the subsection between 0 and 16 (Freedom House, 2014, p. 8):  
 
1) Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and 
fall of these competing parties or groupings? 
2) Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign 
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other 
powerful group? 
3) Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and 
electoral opportunities? 
4) Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic opportunity for the opposition to 
increase its support or gain power through elections? 
 
The subcategory “Electoral process” (Political rights index) is the product of 3 
questions, thus ranging from 0 to 12. It is composed of the following questions (Freedom 
House, 2014, p. 6):  
 
1) Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and 
fair elections? [0 – 4]  
2) Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? [0 
– 4] 
3) Are the electoral laws and framework fair? [0 – 4] 
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Finally, in the subcategory “Associational and Organizational Rights” (Civil Liberties 
Index) countries are awarded from 0 (no) to 4 (yes) in each of the following 
indicators/questions, leading to a score range in the subsection between 0 and 16. The questions 
are as follows (Freedom House, 2014, p. 12): 
 
1) Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
2) “Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private 
organizations?” 
3) Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations?  
 
One of the main strengths of the Freedom House measurement tools is that they are 
well established and widely used, covering virtually the whole world. And since Freedom House 
now also publishes the scores in each of the sub-dimensions, there is greater potential analytical 
leverage.  
However, there are also some downsides to the index. For one, Freedom House 
measures the attainment of thresholds of freedom, democracy and liberties. Therefore, this tool 
does not allow refined analyses of nuances across different types of democratic regimes. The 
index has been criticized for alleged bias against leftist governments (Mainwaring et al., 2001, 53) 
and a lack of transparency in its coding procedures. In the final analysis it is more effective at 
distinguishing between “free countries” and “not free countries” than assessing the differences 
between democratic countries (Coppedge, 2012, 21; Coppedge et al. 2012, 249).  
FH is also biased towards an extreme liberal conception of democracy and 
participation. This is clear in the subcategory “Associational and Organizational Rights”, where 
questions are all framed under topic of freedom. This creates a not very rigorous conception of 
the institutional framework regulating associations. For instance, the questions conflate the 
existence of government control of associations and organizations (there is always some degree 
of it, even in democracies) and repression (clearly a non-democratic trait). The question about 
the degree to which electoral laws and frameworks are fair suffers from the same inadequacy. 
Any electoral system in a democratic regime involves biases and distortions, since it empowers 
some groups and parties in relation to others. But this does not make the system undemocratic 
as such.  
The questions on political pluralism and participation also raise problems. The question 
“Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive 
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political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing 
parties or groupings?” conflates very different things. One part of the question is more about the 
conditions of participation, the other about the actual dynamics of party building and success. In 
addition, some democratic systems are relatively closed to new entrants, but still keep their 
democratic traits.  
 
2.2. Polity 
The original version of the Polity index dates back to 1975 when Ted R. Gurr and Harry 
Eckstein produced a database of the durability of regimes. One of the major innovations of 
Polity was taking an historical approach, providing data since 1800. Since its inception Polity has 
evolved and expanded its scope, assuming its current form (Polity IV) in 2000. It is an index 
suited for capturing changes over time in the patterns of authority in any given country, and 
covers different aspects of political life. Polity IV encompasses three different components: 
Executive Recruitment; Independence of Executive Authority; Political Competition and 
Opposition. At the highest level of aggregation, Polity IV scores range from -10 to +10 and are 
the product of four dimensions: competitiveness of political participation (1‐3); competitiveness 
of executive recruitment (1‐2), openness of executive recruitment (1); constraints on the chief 
executive (1‐4).  
Regarding the general operationalization of the index, each indicator is coded by an 
expert. Indicators are not necessarily ordinal (e.g. ranking from “authoritarian” to “democratic”), 
but are afterwards aggregated into ordinal sub-scores used for the attainment of a score in the 
“Polity2” (-10 +10) scale. Participation is captured by Polity IV through two variables: 1) the 
regulation of participation (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014, p. 25) and the 2) competitiveness of 
participation (Marshall et al., 2014, p. 26). From the interaction of values in these two variables 
different patterns emerge. Ten potential combinations are a priori conceptually determined, 
ranging from “repressed competition” to “institutionalized open electoral participation”, 
covering a high number of possible in-between scenarios.  
The Regulation of Participation is coded through a five-category scale (Marshall et al., 
2014, p. 26): 
 
1) Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political 
organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings 
tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan 
groups (...) 
 7 
2) Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which 
compete for political influence at the national level–parties, regional groups, or ethnic 
groups, no necessarily elected–but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) 
interests 
3) Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and 
intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less 
regularly between intense factionalism and government favouritism (...) 
4) Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense 
factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation 
are regularly excluded from the political process 
5) Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for 
political influence and positions with little use of coercion. 
 
The dimension Competitiveness of Participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences 
for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a 
significant degree of civil interaction, so polities coded as “Unregulated (1)” on Regulation of 
Participation are simply not coded for competitiveness. Competitiveness of participation is 
coded on a five-category scale (Marshall et al., 2014, pp. 26–27):  
 
(1) Repressed: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the 
regime and ruling party. (…) 
(2) Suppressed: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, 
without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, 
extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult 
population) from participation. (…) 
(3) Factional: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly 
compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor 
group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas. 
(4) Transitional: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted, Suppressed, or Factional 
patterns to fully competitive patterns, or vice versa. (…) Sectarian and secular interest 
groups coexist. 
(5) Competitive: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which 
regularly compete for political influence at the national level; (…) Competition among 
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groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be 
restricted in the Competitive pattern  
 
The Polity index has a few strengths. It features extensive instructions for coders and 
several reliability tests are performed; it also features a long and uninterrupted time-series of 
coded cases, from 1800 onwards. However, there is a narrow focus on the institutional side of 
participation. There is an absence of behavioural/altitudinal data, and the equality of 
participation is not an issue taken into account. Critical analyses of this index also point to the 
fact that “scores are clustered around particular values suggesting  that  the  scale  is  not  as  
sensitive  as  it  purports  to  be” (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 249). Although it covers a very long 
temporal period, it leaves unaddressed countries with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants.  
There is also some fuzziness about what the questions purport to measure specifically. For 
instance, the dimensions of participation mix aspects of state authority over the territory with 
issues of participation. The questions seem more suited to grasp the degree to which countries 
have deep territorial conflicts and security problems. Moreover, they do not allow for subtle 
differentiations between democratic regimes, as all would fall under the rubric “regulated”.  
 
2.3. Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 
The Economist Intelligence Unit has published its “Democracy Index” (EIUDI) since 2006, 
with the latest version published in 2013. According to its authors, “measures of democracy that 
reflect the state of political freedoms and civil liberties [such as those provided by Freedom 
House] are not ‘thick’ enough” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013, 26). As such, the EIUDI is 
designed to achieve more in-depth comparisons of the quality of democracy, as well as more 
general comparisons. As an input it makes use not only of experts’ views but also of public 
opinion data and levels of turnout.  
The score for any given country is the product of the aggregation of 5 categories, 
comprising a total of 60 indicators (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013, pp. 29–39):  
 
1 - Electoral process and pluralism (12 indicators);  
2 - Functioning of government (14 indicators); 
3 – Political participation (9 indicators);  
4 - Political culture (8 indicators);  
5 - Civil liberties (17 indicators).  
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Each indicator is either binary (0/1) or ternary (0/0.5/1). The aggregation of each category is not 
simply an average of its indicators, as there are some caveats regarding the fulfilment of some 
critical indicators – e.g. it is a necessary condition to have free and fair elections.  
Regarding the dimension of political participation, its values range from 0 to 10, depending on 
values of the following indicators/questions (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013, p. 33):  
  
1) Voter participation/turn-out for national elections: Average turnout since 2000 
converted into a three-level response (0/0.5/1). Countries with compulsory vote are 
penalised, as the EIUDI explicitly considers this not to be a positive contribution 
towards democracy. 
2) Do ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and 
voice in the political process? Expert assessment. Three levels (0/0.5/1) 
3) Extent of political participation. Membership of political parties and political non-
governmental organisations: Three-level response (0/0.5/1). Full score 1 if over 7% of 
population for either; 
4) Citizens’ engagement with politics: Public opinion, preferably from WVS (World 
Values Survey). Three-level response (0/0.5/1). Full score if over 60% are interested in 
politics; 
5) The preparedness of population to take part in lawful demonstrations: Public 
opinion data, preferably from WVS. Three-level response (0/0.5/1). Full score if over 
40% are willing to attend demonstration; 
6) Adult literacy: Three-level response (0/0.5/1). Full score if over 90%; 6) Extent to 
which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news: Public 
opinion data, preferably from WVS. Three-level response (0/0.5/1). Full score if over 
50% follows politics the news daily; 
7) The authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation: Expert 
assessment, taking into consideration education and other efforts. Three-level response 
(0/0.5/1); 
8) Women in parliament: Three-level response (0/0.5/1) (Full score if more than 20% 
MPs are female). 
 
The EIUDI exhibits important strengths compared with the FITW by FH and Polity. It 
offers a more detailed analysis of the differences across democratic countries and takes into 
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consideration not only experts’ opinions but other sources of data as well, such as electoral 
turnout and public opinion data from comparative surveys.  
However, the EIUDI is not without its drawbacks. From a data access point of view, 
indicator-level data are not publicly available, thus inhibiting our ability to investigate different 
dimensions of participation in political process (e.g. turnout, consultation in public policy, civil 
society strength). Moreover, it mixes substantively different dimensions of participation. It 
bundles in the same variable membership in political parties and in political non-governmental 
organisations—dimensions that can be in tension in many polities. Also, it is problematic to 
measure citizens’ engagement with politics by a measure of “citizens’ interest in politics”. This is 
not so much participation, as (and also disputably) a pre-condition for participation. The same 
reasoning applies to questions like “The preparedness of population to take part in lawful 
demonstrations”, since willingness to attend demonstrations is obviously not the same thing as 
actually doing it. The same could be said of considering “Adult literacy”, “interest in and follows 
politics in the news” and “perceptions of democracy.” A case can be made that these are 
preconditions for participation but it is hard to sustain the case that these are actual components of 
political participation. Finally, the question about the degree to which “authorities make a serious 
effort to promote political participation” is unspecific over which arena that effort is directed. Is 
it about electoral participation, civil society or political parties? And what does it mean, 
specifically? What are those efforts about? 
 
 
2.4. Democracy Barometer 
The Democracy Barometer was launched in 2011 by a consortium between the University of 
Zurich and the Social Science Research Center in Berlin (WZB). It differs from previously 
mentioned indices as its focus is on “the quality of established democracies” (Bühlmann, Merkel, 
Müller, & Weßels, 2008, p. 39). The index has a complex tree-like structure (Merkel et al., 2014, 
p. 3): its starts with a base concept (“Quality of democracy”) branching into three principles 
(“Freedom”, “Control” and “Equality”). Each of these principles then hierarchically nests 
functions, components, sub-components, and indicators. Sub-components are divided into two 
conceptual groups: one group deals with “constitutional settings” (rules) while the other deals 
with “effective impact” (practice). The authors follow a best-practice/worst-practice approach: 
each indicator is standardized, ranging from 0 (worst practice) to 100 (best practice) (Merkel et 
al., 2014, p. 6). It currently covers 70 countries (30 form the core and 40 added later).  
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The “Equality” principle features among its functions transparency, representation and 
participation. The codebook provides the sources used for each indicator, which are mostly 
derived from public opinion data and from other databases. Instead of ranking countries with a 
value located somewhere amid two fixed poles, each indicator is transformed in order to 
standardize the distribution between the empirical maximum and minimum. The authors argue 
that this approach allows them to take into consideration the diversity of empirical forms 
assumed by democracy and the trade-offs implied by favouring particular functions of 
democracy over others (Merkel et al., 2014, pp. 6–7). 
Equality of participation is measured by the following indicators (Merkel et al., 2014, p. 31):  
1) Requirements for and disqualifications of active suffrage (Extracted from Inter 
Parliamentary Union (various years). Chronicle of parliamentary election) 
2) Registered voters as a percentage of voting age population (Extracted from IDEA-
Turnout)  
3) Representative voter turnout in terms of resources (no participation gap in terms of 
education and income). Extracted from various continental Barometers, Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems, European Election Survey, European Social Survey, 
International Social Survey, World Values Survey.  
4) Representative voter turnout in terms of gender and age (no participation gap). 
Extracted from various continental Barometers, Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems, European Election Survey, European Social Survey, International Social 
Survey, World Values Survey.  
5) Representative alternative participation (signing petitions, attending lawful 
demonstrations) in terms of resources (no participation gap). Extracted from various 
continental Barometers, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, European Election 
Survey, European Social Survey, International Social Survey, World Values Survey. 
6) Representative alternative participation (signing petition and attending lawful 
demonstrations) in terms of gender and age (no participation gap). Extracted from 
various continental Barometers, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, European 
Election Survey, European Social Survey, International Social Survey, World Values 
Survey. 
 
Effective participation is measured by the following indicators (Merkel et al., 2014, pp. 31–32):  
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1) Facilitation of electoral participation. Extracted from ACE Electoral Knowledge 
Network; Blais et al. (2007), IDEA-Turnout, Early Voting. Rules facilitating 
participation have the following categories: 0 = voters can vote at specific polling 
station only; 1 = voters can vote everywhere in the same district; 2 = voters can vote 
everywhere in the country; Additional point (+1) if absentee ballot is possible; 
Additional point (+1) if there are mobile polling stations; Additional point (+1) if there 
is a possibility to vote in advance 
2) Registration: Voter registration is not compulsory. Extracted from  ACE Electoral 
Knowledge Network, CON, Rosenberg/Chen (2009). OSCE 
3) Mean participation: Mean participation rate in % of registered electorate in legislative 
election and/or presidential elections (copied to all years) and/or national referenda 
(calculated into mean in corresponding year). Extracted from African Elections 
Database, Australian National University, IDEA-Turnout, International Parliamentary 
Union, University of California (Irvine): The Election Turnout Database, United States 
Elections Project.  
4) Effective use of direct democratic instruments. Extracted from the Centre for 
Research on Direct Democracy (see below) 
5) Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who 
indicate having signed petitions. Extracted from various continental Barometers, 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, European Election Survey, European Social 
Survey, International Social Survey, World Values Survey 
6) Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who 
indicate having attended lawful demonstrations. Extracted from various continental 
Barometers, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, European Election Survey, 
European Social Survey, International Social Survey, World Values Survey. 
 
The Democracy Barometer has important advantages over the previous indices. By 
incorporating public opinion data it allows researchers to weigh in the relevance of inequalities in 
turnout and protest/civil society participation. Inequality is also measured comprehensively, as it 
includes several dimensions: gender, age, education and income. It also attempts to harmonize 
public opinion data from multiple sources.  
A limitation of the DB is that it relies completely upon secondary sources. It is also 
biased toward democracy as it is intended to measure quality of democracy, and thus does not 
allow gradations between non-democratic and hybrid regimes. The procedure of standardization 
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from 0 (worst practice) to 100 (best practice) might have some unintended consequences, since 
some indicators, which are institutional preconditions of participation (e.g. freedom of 
association), could be warranted a more weight (on this point see our discussion below). 
 
2.5. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2011) 
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) focuses on countries in development and 
transition. Its 2014 edition is comprised of two different indices: the Status Index, which ranks 
quality of democracy and market economy, and the Management Index, which ranks the 
countries according to their leadership’s political management performance between January 
2011 and January 2013. It covers 129 countries, purposely excluding consolidated democracies, 
understood as those that were members of OECD by 1989, and countries with less than 2 
million inhabitants (with some exceptions, such as Estonia).  
It is operationalised as follows: one country expert writes a country report in which 
(s)he answers 49 questions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 6), each of which are then 
summarised into a numerical indicator (1-10).  These indicators are later harmonised in regional 
and interregional calibration processes. Indicators are aggregated into criteria scores (averages), 
one of them being “political participation”. Political participation is one of three criteria listed 
under the “Political Transformation” dimension. It is computed from the following indicators, 
each ranging from 1 to 10 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, pp. 18–19):  
 
1) To what extent are political representatives determined by general, free and fair 
elections? 
2) To what extent do democratically elected rulers have the effective power to govern? 
To what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves?  
3) To what extent can individuals form and join independent political parties or   civic 
groups? To what extent can these groups associate and assemble freely 
4) To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions 
freely?  
 
The BTI also includes inequality as one of the indicators measured under the “Welfare 
regime” criterion of the “Economic Transformation” dimension. It is thus possible to combine 
analyses of inequality with political participation. It asks “To what extent are significant parts of 
the population fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty and inequality?” 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 26) The codebook stresses that the following should be taken 
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into account (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 26): the overall level of socioeconomic 
development; the poverty rate; the level of inequality with regard to income and education; the 
level of exclusion, based on gender, religion and ethnicity; the scope of subsistence economy. 
Another analytical dimension (Political and social integration) assesses whether “stable 
patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the state” and the existence of 
“a consolidated civic culture” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 23). It is the product of the 
following indicators, each ranging from 1 to 10 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 23):  
 
1) To what extent is there a stable, moderate, socially rooted party system able to 
articulate and aggregate societal interests? [From 1, lowest score, to 10, highest score, 
where “The party system is stable and socially rooted: it is able to articulate and 
aggregate societal interest with low fragmentation, low voter volatility and low 
polarization”)  
2) To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to 
mediate between society and the political system? [From 1 (“Interest groups are present 
only in isolated social segments, are on the whole poorly balanced and cooperate little. 
A large number of social interests remain unrepresented.”) to 10 (“There is a broad 
range of interest groups that reflect competing social interests, tend to balance one 
another and are cooperative.”)] 
3) How strong is the citizens’ approval of democratic norms and procedures.  
4) To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social capital 
advanced?  
5) To what extent does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in 
the political process? The political leadership obstructs civil society participation. It 
suppresses civil society organizations and excludes its representatives from the policy 
process”) to 10 (“The political leadership actively enables civil society participation. It 
assigns an important role to civil society actors in deliberating and determining 
policies.)]. This question captures the link between civil society (understood in a broad 
sense, including “civic, economic and professional interest associations, religious, 
charity and community-based organizations, intellectuals, scientists and journalists”) 
and the various stages of the policy process (agenda setting; policy formulation; 
deliberation and decision-making; policy implementation; performance monitoring) 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 42). 
 
 15 
One of the main strengths of the BTI is that it allows researchers to combine the 
analysis of participation and equality levels. There is also a high degree of standardization in its 
coding procedures. However, the fact that one country expert writes a country report in which 
(s)he answers 49 questions poses some risks, since it is arguably difficult to find a country expert 
who knows about all aspects of a given polity to the same degree. The use of country/thematic 
experts is much more rigorous (ex: an expert on elections in Spain; an expert on civil society in 
Italy). This is the practice used in the V-Dem Project, as reported below. Moreover, the BTI 
does not cover Western European countries.  
Regarding participation, the variables are similar to those employed by Freedom House, that 
is, basic thresholds that do not allow for deeply nuanced analyses. Also, welfare regime is only a 
proxy for inequalities in political participation. Finally, many questions are posed in an imprecise 
way. For example, the question “To what extent are significant parts of the population 
fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty and inequality?” does not capture patterns 
of participation but just socioeconomic exclusion. The two might be positively related, but they 
are totally different things. And in fact, this would not capture situations where the poor and the 
excluded actively participate, as is the case in some democracies. Moreover, the BTI links a culture 
of high social trust with the density of civil society (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 35). Again, 
these may indeed be positively related, but that is not necessarily so. Contexts of active 
participation in civil society can generate an anti-democratic political culture and generalized 
distrust of competing social categories (e.g.: ethnic conflict). It is also problematic to combine in 
the same question the existence of “veto powers and political enclaves”. The former can be 
normal democratic institutions like constitutional courts. The later could include separatism and 
regional-military bosses with the facto power and thus reflect a non-democratic situation.  
Finally, the extent to which “citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?” 
is not a dimension of participation as such, though it can, perhaps, be considered as a causal 
previous condition. 
 
2.6. Civicus - Enabling Environment Index (EEI) 
The Enabling Environment Index (EEI) was created by Civicus, a global network of NGOs. An 
enabling environment is defined as “a set of conditions that impact on the capacity of citizens (whether 
individually or in an organized fashion) to participate and engage in the civil society arena in a sustained and 
voluntary manner” (Fioramonti, 2013, p. 3). The index thus measures three different dimensions: 
governance environment (50%); Socio-economic environment (25%); socio-cultural 
environment (25%). Each of these dimension has a number of associated sub-dimensions, which 
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are the product of the aggregation of 71 different sources, ranging from other indices (Freedom 
House, UNHDI, BTI), public opinion data (WVS, EVS, World Giving Index) and other 
indicators (World Bank Development indicators, Reporters without borders). The EEI thus 
combines information from a considerable array of different sources into three middle-level 
indices and one at the highest level of aggregation.   
Its main strengths are the focus on civil society and the idea that the environment of 
participation is a crucial dimension of participation itself.  An important limitation is the lack of 
transparency of the coding procedures; and although it includes several questions on 
participation (% people who would do or have done acts like signing petitions, participate in 
boycotts, and attend lawful demonstrations; % of people volunteering; and data on the civil 
society infrastructure and density) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 2), the data is not 
available at the indicator level.  
 
2.7.  World Bank Governance Indicators 
The World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) were first collected in 1996 and consist of 
aggregate indicators in six key governance areas, one of them being “Voice and Accountability” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 2). Each indicator results from the aggregation of several different 
variables coming from four main types: surveys of households and firms. commercial business 
information providers, non-governmental organizations, and public sector organizations 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 5). It relies upon the aggregation of a diversity of indicators (not all 
are available for every country) each of them being standardized from 0 to 1. Using an 
Unobserved Components Model, the authors of this index then standardize the distribution of 
values across indicators into a [–2.5:+2.5] scale.  
The Voice and Accountability (VA) dimension intends to capture perceptions about the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. It has the following 
indicators of participation: freedom of association (extracted from Economist Intelligence Unit), 
and civil society, electoral process, and political rights (all extracted from Freedom House). Thus, 
the comments about FH and EIU apply here too. 
 
 
 
 
 17 
2.8.  The Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP, Johns Hopkins 
University) 
The Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP) was launched in 1991 by Johns Hopkins 
University with the main objective of clarifying “the scope, structure, and financial base of the nonprofit 
sector in a cross-section of countries using a coherent, comparative approach” (Salomon and Anheier, 1992, p. 
2). One critical aspect of research on the nonprofit sector was the lack of available data – not 
only for comparative endeavours but even for analysis at the country level. Therefore the project 
was designed from its inception to provide a deep understanding of how and why the nonprofit 
sector differs across contexts. In order to improve the conditions of comparability, the project 
coordinators established a common definition of the nonprofit sector to be used across 
countries (Salamon & Anheier, 1992, p. 10):  
“(1) formally constituted; (2) nongovernmental; (3) non-profit-distributing; 4) self-governing; (5) non-partisan; (6) 
non-religious organizations, characterized (7) by some degree of voluntary involvement.” 
The process of data collection is as follows (Salamon & Sokolowski, 1999, p. 470). 
First, an inventory of available statistical data sources for each country is performed in order to 
account for national economic census, industrial surveys, special surveys on nonprofit 
organizations, official economic statistics, national registers of legal entities, population census, 
population surveys, financial budgets, and labour force surveys. Existing data sources are used to 
estimate values for the various dimensions under analysis. If available data are insufficient, 
targeted surveys are conducted for supplementing the gaps. The key variables under analysis are 
(Salamon & Sokolowski, 1999, p. 469):  
 
1) Expenditures: The costs incurred in the general operations of an organization 
2) Employment: computed as a share of total nonagricultural employment 
3) Volunteers: the number of volunteers working for nonprofit organizations in our 
target countries  
4) Revenues: inflows of spendable resources received by the organization during the 
year 
5) Fees and charges: membership dues; service charges paid directly by the client in 
exchange for services; investment income; and income from the sale of goods and 
services 
6) Public sector payments: revenues coming from all branches of government 
7) Philanthropy/private giving: revenues received from individual contributions, private 
foundation grants, corporate donations and federated giving funds or programs. 
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The critical strength of the CNP is its effort to cross-nationally chart an arena of society for 
which comparative data are scarce. A limitation is that more attention is given to the shape of the 
nonprofit sector rather than the structure and participatory environment of civil society as such. 
Issues crucial in civil society studies like the number of organizations, their dimension and levels 
of membership are not considered. It is not possible to know if civil society is constituted by a 
set of small associations or large mass associations. It excludes unions, religious organizations, 
and political movements. No data on membership levels are provided. 
 
2.9 . Eurobarometer 
The Eurobarometer has been carried out by the European Commission since 1973 (European 
Commission, 2013, p. 5). It currently involves the 28 member states of the EU plus a varying 
number of candidate countries. The core questions of the “Standard Eurobarometer” deal 
mostly with attitudes towards the EU and its institutions. However, since 1990, special 
Eurobarometers have been conducted on a diverse array of topics, including values, attitudes and 
behaviour towards participation and democracy. In addition, flash Eurobarometers can be 
requested by the services of the European Commission, and some have dealt specifically with 
questions  of participation such as Flash EB 373 (“Europeans’ engagement in  participatory 
democracy”) and Flash EB 375 (“European youth: participation in democratic life”). The 
Eurobarometer occasionally features questions about organisational membership in a wide range 
of organisations (for instance, see EB 73.4, of May 2010), thus providing good indicators about 
the density of membership in civil society organisations and political parties. However, due to 
the character of public opinion data in question, the Eurobarometer does not provide any 
information about the institutional framework on which respondents operate, be it at the 
national, regional or local scale. 
 
2.10. European Values Study 
The European Values Study is coordinated by the Tilburg University and has been responsible 
for the collection of four rounds of public opinion data, from 1981 to 2008. In its latest round, 
the European Values Survey covered six research topics (life, family, work, religion, politics, and 
society) and was applied in forty-seven countries. Participation in the political sphere was 
covered in this wave by the following questions (EVS, 2011):  
1) Voluntary organizations and activities: Please look carefully at the following list of 
voluntary organizations and activities and say a) which, if any, do you belong to? b) 
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which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for? A - Social welfare 
services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people; B - Religious or church 
organizations; C - Education, arts, music or cultural activities; D - Trade unions; E - 
Political parties or groups; F - Local community action on issues like poverty, 
employment, housing, racial equality; G - Third world development or human rights; H 
- Conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights; I - Professional associations; J 
- Youth work (e.g. scouts, guides, youth clubs etc.); K - Sports or recreation; L - 
Women’s groups; M - Peace movement; N - Voluntary organizations concerned with 
health; O - Other groups. 
2) Forms of political action: I’m going to read out some different forms of political 
action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have 
actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any 
circumstances, do it. A - Signing a petition; B- Joining in boycotts; C- attending lawful 
demonstrations, D-joining unofficial strikes, E-occupying buildings or factories 
 
Similarly to the Eurobarometer, it provides a good and reasonably accurate measure of density of 
membership of civil society. However it does not offer any information about the institutional 
framework of the respondent, be it at the national, regional or local scale. 
 
2.11. World Values Survey 
The first wave of the World Values Survey was applied in tandem with the EVS in 1981. 
Currently the World Values Survey Association autonomously administers the survey, which has 
been conducted over six waves (World Values Survey, 2015). The WVS has a global scope, 
having covered over all the waves some 90 countries throughout the world. It features questions 
about values and attitudes towards politics, the economy, society and religion, as well as on the 
activities developed by respondents within different types or organizations. The latest wave, 
which was applied in 55 countries, included the following questions on participation (World 
Values Survey, 2014, p. 2):  
1) “For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an 
inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?” A - Church or 
religious organization; B - Sport or recreational, C- Art, music or educational 
organization; D- Labor Union; E-political party, F-environmental organizations, G-
professional organizational, H-humanitarian or charitable organization, I-consumer 
organization, J- Self-help group, mutual aid group; K - Other organization 
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2) “I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, 
whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it (read out and 
code one answer for each action): A- Signing a petition; B- Joining in boycotts; C-
Attending peaceful demonstrations; D- Joining strikes; E- Any other act of protest. For 
those reporting as having done any of those, a further question asks how many times 
the respondent engaged in that behavior over the last year. 
The strengths and limitations discussed above for the European Values Study apply here too.  
 
 
2.12. Vanhanen’s Democratization Index 
In the 1960s, Tatu Vanhanen started collecting data about the distribution of power in an 
increasing scope of societies around the world (Vanhanen, 2014). In a similar way to Robert 
Dahl, Vanhanen considers that the degree of democracy can be fundamentally captured by the 
interaction of two dimensions central to the electoral realm: competition and participation. The 
degree of competition is defined as “the smaller parties' share of the votes cast in parliamentary 
or presidential elections, or both” (Vanhanen, 2014, p. 8). Participation is measured by “the 
percentage of the population which actually voted in the same elections” (Vanhanen, 2014, p. 8). 
The index of democratization is the product of these two by dimensions divided by 100.  
An advantage of Vanhanen’s index is its extensive coverage. The dataset encompasses 
virtually all independent countries in the world from 1810 to 2012. However, it sticks to a strictly 
electoral conception of democracy, not capturing evolutions in other dimensions. 
 
2.13. General evaluation 
Although extant measures are useful for some purposes, applied work and research on the 
causes and consequences of democracy are share a few common limitations. First, most indices 
are highly aggregated, which means they are helpful for summary judgments but not for a more 
nuanced understanding. Even where various components of an index are available these 
components still measure quite general concepts. What is more, the degree to which various 
components of an index are truly independent of one other is unclear: they may simply reflect a 
coder’s overall sense of how democratic a country is. Second, most indices are constructed to 
measure only one or two dimensions of democracy – generally, the “liberal” (Madisonian) or 
“electoral” (Schumpeterian) dimensions. Third, indices tend to cover a global sample of 
countries for recent years but rarely extend back further in time. Fourth, attention is rarely paid 
to transparency and replicability in data collection and aggregation. Fifth, although public 
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opinion data can be revealing about how citizens of each country evaluate their own political 
system, their opinions are not intended to compare their country to others, and there is little 
reason to believe that they are comparable across countries. Finally, potential problems of 
measurement error are left unaddressed, while routine tools such as inter-coder reliability scores 
tend to be ignored. The absence of reliability data means that the accuracy of the data is either 
unknown or unreported. Indeed, several recent analyses have shown that they cannot make fine 
distinctions reliably.  
 
3. Conceptualizing and Measuring Political Participation using 
the Varieties of Democracy Approach 
Defining a social concept is a necessary step before attempting to measure it (Goertz, 2006; 
Sartori, 1970). In the case of political participation, we can think of it as being structured in three 
main arenas. The first of them is the electoral arena. In a democratic polity elections are the 
critical instrument at the disposal of citizens to determine the choice of their representatives and, 
consequently, to influence the policies pursued by those (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). 
Despite longstanding discussions about the necessary conditions for a regime to be considered 
democratic, free and fair elections do constitute a core requirement of virtually all conceptions of 
democracy – even minimalist ones (Munck, 2009, p. 17). 
The second arena of participation lies within the realm of political parties. These 
organizations play a pivotal role in aggregating and expressing political preferences, recruiting 
potential members of the political elite and offering alternative political platforms to the 
electorate (Schmitter, 2001) 
Finally, there is the arena of civil society, which can be synthetically defined as the 
“networks of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the 
state” (Bermeo, 2003, p. 7). The conceptual and practical boundaries between political parties 
and civil society are not always clear (Katz & Mair, 1995); however, for the purposes of defining 
and measuring political participation, subsuming political parties in the sphere of civil society 
would carry fewer advantages than granting them an autonomous arena mediating between the 
state and society. It has been argued that widespread participation in civil society organizations 
yields positive effects at both the societal and individual level (Bernhard, 1993; Bernhard & Kaya, 
2012; Putnam, 1993, 2000), although some authors dispute this assertion (Berman, 1997; Jamal, 
2007).  
 22 
We try to measure each of these arenas taking into consideration whenever possible 
indicators from three relevant dimensions. The first is the institutional: the opportunities for 
participation at the disposal of citizens vary deeply from country to country. These frameworks 
are shaped by a set of interrelated institutions, which are not neutral in the sense that they 
constitute “collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend 
interests” (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 738). The second dimension that we bear in mind is the 
organizational, or behavioural. This dimension refers to the conversion by citizens of the 
opportunities laid out by their institutional context. Indeed, most comparative analyses of 
participation take into consideration its level or volume (e.g. levels of turnout; membership and 
participation in political parties; membership and participation in civil society organizations). 
Finally we try to account for the political culture inherent to participation contexts (Almond & 
Verba, 1965; Sabetti, 2007). By doing so, we try to measure the adhesion of political participation 
actions to core democratic values.  
The combination of these three dimensions implies a sequence of logically nested 
questions. The institutional context is arguably the most critical for participation to occur: Are 
citizens offered the opportunities to participate (be it in elections, political parties or civil society 
organisations)? The organisational and behavioural context refers to the level and variety of ways 
of participating: Given the opportunity to participate, do citizens embrace it, and how much do 
they so? Finally, the cultural dimension offers an insight into the contours of political action: 
How do citizens make use of participation? 
The following step is to find relevant indicators for each arena. For this purpose, the V-
Dem project seems like the most valuable source of indicators. Once completed, V-Dem will 
arguably provide the most thorough dataset on democracy allowing end-users to make use of its 
disaggregated indicators in order to build their own indexes. Indeed, the approach outlined in 
this section would require its own data collection if it were not for the publicly available 
disaggregated data available in V-Dem, and not in its competitor indices. 
Table 3 summarizes the information we are seeking to combine2. Regarding the 
electoral arena, this is one of the areas in which V-Dem provides substantial data, of which we 
start by selecting the degree to which national elections were multiparty, their free and fair character, 
                                                      
2 Given the variety of measurement scales, every variable was be converted into a [0:1] interval using the following 
formula:  
 
x' = !! !"#!(!)!"#!(!)!!"#!(!)  
 
Where both min (x) and max (x) refer to the values, within the V-Dem dataset, attributed to Southern European 
countries for a given year/indicator pair. The scores would be quite different, probably higher, if they were 
calculated for a global sample covering a longer time period. 
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and the elected (vs. appointed) nature of local government3. The behavioural dimension of electoral 
participation is captured through turnout in the closest election. Turnout is often subject to 
various measures that might affect its comparability, so we choose to go for the proportion of 
voters within the voting age population as provided by the Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance and also distributed in the V-Dem dataset. Regarding the cultural dimension 
of electoral participation , we incorporate the freedom of the media coverage during campaign, which 
accounts for the extent to which electoral participation is enhanced by a fully democratic 
campaign environment. An informed electorate with access to a diversity of political views 
during campaign time is critical for a fully democratic election process. 
Table I.A – Variables in the index 
Arenas Indicators 
Electoral (1st term) Election free and fair (V-Dem: v2elfrfair) 
Elections multiparty (V-Dem: v2elmulpar)   
Local government elected (V-Dem: v2ellocelc)  
Election free campaign media (V-Dem: v2elfrcamp) 
 
Electoral (2nd term) Election Voting Age Population turnout (V-Dem: v2elvaptrn)4 
 
Political parties Party ban (V-Dem: v2psparban)  
Opposition parties autonomy (V-Dem: v2psoppaut)  
Party linkages (V-Dem: v2psprlnks) 
Distinct party platforms (V-Dem: v2psplats) 
Party branches (V-Dem:  v2psprbrch) 
 
Civil society CSO entry and exit (V-Dem: v2cseeorgs) 
CSO repression (V-Dem: v2csreprss) 
CSO consultation (V-Dem: v2cscnsult) 
CSO participatory environment (V-Dem: v2csprtcpt) 
 
                                                      
3 Some of these variables refer to specific general elections, while others are coded every year. For the years in which 
a general election did not occur, the most straightforward solution is the method already employed by the V-Dem of 
using the values coded for the most recent election, unless there is an interruption of the electoral regime. 
4 We chose turnout using as denominator the voting age population (VAP) to avoid the problem of outdated 
electoral registries. The VAP is not without its shortcomings, though: it is composed of all the individuals older than 
a certain threshold, without accounting for different electoral status (residents who are non-nationals and therefore 
are not allowed to vote, for instance). The data have been originally collected by IDEA and are part of the V-Dem 
dataset as well. 
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V-Dem also offers a comprehensive array of indicators related to the participation in 
political parties. Regarding its institutional dimension, we select two variables: the existence of bans 
on political parties, and the autonomy of opposition parties. Although V-Dem does not offer 
information about the level of adhesion to political parties, there are two meaningful and helpful 
organizational indicators: the professionalization of party organizations, their territorial diffusion, 
and the existence of party linkages with other organisations. The political culture of parties can 
be captured by the degree of dissimilitude between party platforms of different parties.  
Finally, we try to capture the institutional context of civil society by incorporating three 
variables: the individual freedom to join and exit organizations; the extent to which civil society operates 
without restraint; and civil society’s role in public policy consultation. The organisational and cultural 
dimensions are captured through a variable measuring the proportion of citizens involved with 
organizations.  
At this point we have chosen several relevant indicators from the V-Dem database and 
converted into a [0:1] scale. The following step has to do with the aggregation of each set of 
indicators into a single arena sub-score5. Three principal components analyses were performed 
using as a source the V-Dem values of five Southern European countries: France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. This implies that the domain of comparison and the range of the variables 
were restricted to this subset. If the Principal Component Analyses was to be carried out using 
information from the whole globe from 1900 on, as the dataset would have allowed, the 
resulting scores would very likely make the Southern European countries have closer values, as 
historically extreme cases of low participation would have been taken into account. The 
procedure carried out here thus allows for a more detailed comparison between a limited set of 
countries in a limited period in time (1970-2012). This statistical procedure implies that different 
sets of data generate different weights.  
After performing the three PCA, we observe that the only case in which one variable 
did not show a satisfactory correlation with the remaining ones was turnout. Given the centrality 
of turnout to assess electoral and political participation writ large, we have chosen to make it 
interact with the remaining variables through a multiplication. The electoral arena participation 
score is thus the product of 1) the aggregation of the four previously mentioned variables into a 
single score via PCA, and 2) the level [0:1] of turnout in the latest election. The other two sub-
                                                      
5 There would be alternatives to this procedure. One of them would be to attribute a priori weights to each of the 
variables instead of relying on the scores yielded by principal components analysis. However, this could be a 
potential source of bias. Another option would be to develop a cumulative scale (Skaaning S.-E, Bartusevicius H, & 
Gerring J, 2014), with the caveat that its constitutive elements would not be binary but continuous This would allow 
to establish a theoretical hierarchy between dimensions (such as institutional context > density > culture). 
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indices result from the loadings of the variables that compose each arena according to the scores 
obtained in PCA. The PCA results are available as appendixes. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix between the three scores 
Correlations (Pearson) 
 Electoral arena  
(with turnout) 
Political 
parties arena 
Civil society 
arena 
Electoral arena (with 
turnout) 
1   
Political parties arena 0.79 1  
Civil society arena 0.67 0.90 1 
 
 
The three resulting arena scores are correlated with each other in different degrees. 
Participation in political parties and in civil society are highly correlated (0. 90), whereas the 
aggregate score of the electoral arena is relatively less correlated with the latter (0.67).  
A final step is thus to aggregate these three scores into a single measurement for every 
country-year. As discussed by Munck (2009, pp. 48–49), there are two main decisions when 
deciding the method of aggregation to use: 1) should a high score in an indicator be annulled by 
a low score in other indicator (interaction) and 2) can a low score in an indicator be attenuated 
by a high score in other indicator (compensation).  
Since each of the arenas is vital for a vibrant democracy we follow the example of the 
Human Development Index of the United Nations (2010, p. 15) and aggregate the final score of 
using a geometric mean rather than an arithmetic one. The three sub-scores were rescaled into a 
[0:1] interval and subsumed into a general political participation index, with participation for 
country i in year t thus being given by:  
 Participation!!" = Electoral!!"×!Political!parties!!"×!Civil!society!!"!  
 
 
Results are displayed in figures 1 and 2. 
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3.3. Comparison with other indicators 
After computing the arena scores and the final index, we compare their performance of with 
some of the established indicators reviewed in the second section. We will discuss the evolution 
of these indices across the five countries.   
Figure 1: Arena Scores 
 
 
 Figure 2: Participation index 
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We compare it against the two Freedom House scores (Civil Liberties and Political 
Rights), the Polity 2 revised score, and the Vanhanen index. The data on these external indicators 
come are obtained via the Quality of Government dataset of Gothenburg University (Teorell et 
al. 2015). 
The correlation matrix is presented in table 3. Correlation coefficients with the existing 
indices are high. While this is somewhat reassuring in terms of the external validity of our 
aggregated index, it also raises the issue of whether it is efficient in adding new information 
about the polities. However, visual inspection of the country trends suggests that our 
Participation Index might be more sensitive to short term effects.  
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix with other indices (1972-2010) 
 
Part_Index fh_pr fh_cl p_polity2 p_parcomp p_parreg van_index van_part 
Part_Index 1        
fh_pr 0.89 1       
fh_cl 0.73 0.76 1      
p_polity2 0.88 0.91 0.80 1     
p_parcomp 0.49 0.49 0.27 0.44 1    
p_parreg 0.46 0.47 0.24 0.41 1.00 1   
van_index 0.72 0.79 0.55 0.80 0.44 0.41 1  
van_part 0.69 0.82 0.63 0.87 0.45 0.43 0.91 1 
 
Notes: N = 190.  
 
The evolution of our indicators of participation can be compared with the values in 
other indices as a way to ensure validity but also to show whether it captures something else. We 
pick three indices for comparability purposes: Freedom House, with its two dimensions 
(“Political rights” and “Civil liberties”); Polity (revised combined score); and Vanhanen’s index 
of democratization. All indices converge in the marked increases that followed the regime 
changes in the 1970s in Portugal, Greece, and Spain.  
In the five countries under consideration, after the transitions to democracy were 
complete, Freedom House’s two indices range between 1 and 3. While in some countries (France 
and Portugal) this has meant that the values have basically remained constant, in others a more 
dynamic evolution is implied by the data. The V-Dem political parties, when compared to the 
 28 
equivalent Freedom House index (the political rights index), shows a similar high ranking and 
classification for the case of France comparatively to the other southern European countries. V-
Dem and Freedom House also capture in similar ways the rankings of the three countries that 
democratized in the 1970s, all showing a spectacular rise in the political parties indexes from the 
mid-1970s to the early 1980s.  
But when looking for finer variations between the cases of Greece, Spain, Italy, and 
Portugal, the FH index is not enough. All these democracies evidence very similar scores and no 
signs of change over time since 1980. By contrast, the V-Dem index is better able to capture 
significant political change in the realm of political parties, namely Italy’s slight decline since the 
1990s, with the end of the traditional post second world war party system, Spain’s decline since 
the early 2000s because of corruption scandals (Gunther and Diamandouros, 2001; Gunther, 
Montero, Botella, 2004), and even the slight rise in Portugal since the mid-1980s, when the party 
system stabilized after the electoral defeat of political parties sponsored by the President of the 
Republic (Jalali, 2007). 
 
Figure 3: Freedom house – Political rights and Civil liberties indices 
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Civil society indexes by Freedom House (civil liberties index) and V-Dem are both able 
to track some major trends, like the huge rise of civil society during transition and early 
consolidation of democratic regimes (mid-1970s to mid-1980s). But V-Dem is able to portray 
much more specifically the evolution and different nature of civil society in countries like 
Portugal and Spain, where the superior density and political incorporation of Portuguese civil 
society demonstrated by V-Dem confirms existing historical and qualitative research (Fishman, 
2011; Fernandes, 2014). Portugal ranks always above Spain since the mid-1980s in the V-Dem 
index, whereas in the Freedom House civil liberties index both countries have almost similar 
scores. 
The revised polity score results from the combinations of two other Polity scores, 
where the autocracy score is subtracted from the democracy score. The results from each of 
these two the indices are calculated on the basis of four dimensions: competitiveness of political 
participation, openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the chief executive. Since each of the two previous indices “p_autoc” and 
“p_democ” vary from 0 to 10, the revised polity score varies between -10 (autocracy) and 10 
(democracy) (Teorell et al. 2015). 
The Polity index remains quite insensitive to finer variations as well. Like the previous 
indexes, it captures the major regime transitions of the mid-1970s. At the same time it is unable 
to capture any variation between countries, since these have a totally equal ranking and 
classification, something which is quite implausible. The V-Dem elections index is much better 
in this regard. For instance it clearly shows that Italy and France rank higher than any other 
Southern European democracy. This finding gives validity to theories that argue that older 
democracies tend to have more competitive and free elections and higher turnout, because of the 
fact that they started in an pre-television era, when strong mass mobilizing parties where the only 
vehicles linking masses to elites (Bartolini & Mair, 2001). But V-Dem also captures variations 
between older democracies, showing a decline in the elections index in all countries since the 
2000s, with the exception France, a puzzling variation which remains to be explained.  
Vanhanen’s index uses a dimension of competition derived from electoral results that is absent 
from our index. It provides an interesting comparison as it is the only of the three that takes into 
account voter turnout. Indeed, it has a high Pearson coefficient of correlation with our electoral 
score for the countries and years under consideration (0.88).  
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Figure 4: Revised combined Polity Score 
 
 
Figure 5: Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization
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Vanhanen’s index of democratization can also be compared to our general index of 
participation (Figure 5). Both indexes can somehow be considered approximations to the quality 
of democracy in these countries, but V-Dem’s index is much more complete, since it implies the 
aggregation of levels of citizen participation in elections, civil society and party organizations, 
whereas Vanhanen’s only captures levels turnout. From Vanhanen’s index, which is just an 
electoral point of view, France has the weakest quality of democracy, whereas our V-Dem index 
gives France (immediately followed by Portugal), the best score. This lends confirmation to 
existing research that shows that post-revolutionary societies, of which Portugal and France are 
examples, tend to have better democracies (Fishman, 2011) and higher levels of civic and 
political participation (Fernandes, 2014; Hunt, 1984; Sewell, 1980; Tilly, 1986).  
 
 
Conclusion  
In this paper we presented and discussed existing measurements of participation and offered an 
alternative conceptualization based on the possibilities offered by the V-Dem project. By taking 
into account the diversity of participation channels that citizens have at their disposal, we were 
able not only to create a more multidimensional index, but also to chart more clearly for the 
Southern European region its country-specific trajectories and between-country variations. 
Moving beyond the identification of these trajectories and trying to assess their underlying causal 
roots will be the next crucial step in future research. 
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Appendix I.A - Output of Principal Components Analysis: 
Electoral arena (before taking turnout into account) 
 
Principal components/correlation                   Number of obs = 215 
Number of comp.  =   1 
Trace = 4 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)               Rho = 0.8336 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 3.33 2.92 0.83 0.83 
Comp2 0.42 0.25 0.10 0.94 
Comp3 0.17 0.90 0.04 0.98 
Comp4 0.08  0.02 1.00 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
Variable Comp1 Unexplained 
v2elmulpar 0.46 0.29 
v2xel_locelec 0.52 0.11 
v2elfrcamp 0.49 0.21 
v2elfrfair 0.53 0.06 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable kmo 
v2elmulpar 0.81 
v2xel_loce~c 0.85 
v2elfrcamp 0.82 
v2elfrfair 0.72 
Overall 0.79 
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Appendix I.B – Output of Principal Components Analysis: 
Political parties arena 
  
Principal components/correlation                   Number of obs = 215 
Number of comp.  =   1 
Trace = 5 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)               Rho = 0.7727 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 3.86 3.10 0.77 0.77 
Comp2 0.76 0.55 0.15 0.92 
Comp3 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.97 
Comp4 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.99 
Comp5 0.37  0.01 1.00 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
Variable Comp1 Unexplained 
v2psoppaut 0.48 0.11 
v2psparban 0.45 0.23 
v2psprbrch 0.40 0.38 
v2psplats 0.47 0.13 
v2psprlnks 0.43 0.27 
 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable kmo 
v2psoppaut 0.86 
v2psparban 0.86 
v2psprbrch 0.76 
v2psplats 0.71 
v2psprlnks 0.71 
Overall 0.78 
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Appendix I.C – Output of Principal Components Analysis: Civil 
Society arena 
 
Principal components/correlation                   Number of obs = 215 
Number of comp.  =   1 
Trace = 4 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)               Rho = 0.8636 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 3.45 3.24 0.86 0.86 
Comp2 0.21 0.01 0.05 0.92 
Comp3 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.97 
Comp4 0.13  0.03 1 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
Variable Comp1 Unexplained 
v2csprtcpt 0.50 0.15 
v2cseeorgs 0.51 0.11 
v2csreprss -0.49 0.16 
v2cscnsult 0.50 0.13 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable kmo 
v2csprtcpt 0.89 
v2cseeorgs 0.83 
v2csreprss 0.89 
v2cscnsult 0.86 
Overall 0.87 
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